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WELFARE REFORM WITHIN A CHANGING
CONTEXT: REDEFINING THE TERMS OF
THE DEBATE
Mary Bryna Sanger, Ph.D. *
Author's Note: As this Essay goes to press, there is news of Presi-
dent Clinton's veto of a welfare bill that would have radically al-
tered the federal program along the lines anticipated by this
Article.' The legislative tally suggests that there are insufficient
congressional proponents of the most recent bill to muster the
two-thirds majority necessary to override the veto.b Nevertheless,
it is likely that any compromise bill worked out between the Presi-
dent and the Republican-led Congress will include many of the
provisions contained in the most recent bill.c
The most recent bill eliminated the entitlement status of welfare
for cash assistance to children; instead it provided fixed block
grants to the states for cash assistance. The bill imposed a five
year time limit and left wide discretion over eligibility standards
and benefit levels to the states. Strong work requirements were
included with specific and increasing annual percentages of the
caseload that must be employed. Federal policy would have ex-
plicitly prohibited increased benefits for mothers on welfare who
bear additional children. Only state law could have overridden
this prohibition. Few additional resources were provided for
child care and employment training, despite the more stringent
work requirements. Further, the bill included provisions to re-
duce Medicaid and remove the automatic eligibility that AFDC
recipients now enjoy. Finally, the bill reduced the level of income
supplementation for low income working families now provided
by the Earned Income Tax Credit.d
• B.A., Vassar College; Ph.D., Brandeis University. Dr. Sanger is an Associate
Dean and Professor at the New School for Social Research, Milano Graduate School
of Management and Urban Policy. The author would like to thank Bonita Stowell for
her invaluable research assistance on all aspects of this paper.
aSee Robert Pear, Battle Over the Budget: The Legislation; Clinton Vetoes G.O.P.
Plan to Change Welfare System, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 1996, at B7.
bid. ("The final version of the bill was approved in the House 245 to 178 and in
the senate 52 to 47.").
cVd. ("[President] Clinton said that he would 'keep working with Congress to en-
act real bipartisan welfare reform' . . . . Both parties agree on the need for major
changes in the welfare system, and they have been discussing such changes as part of a
mammoth deal to balance the federal budget.").
dId. ("The bill would have undone six decades of social welfare policy by ending
the federal guarantee of cash assistance for millions of poor children. Instead, each
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If some of these provisions are included in the compromise bill,
the effects discussed in this Essay will develop. Poverty rates will
rise significantly,e insecurity and instability will grow, and the
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Introduction
Welfare is at the center of a shifting view of the role of govern-
ment in the United States. For many Americans, welfare is a sym-
bol of what has gone wrong with our country.' Rather than
viewing welfare as a necessary social tool to cushion the economic
shocks of unpredictable and adverse personal events and labor
market fluctuations, it is now seen as a vehicle for undermining
personal responsibility and initiative.2
Similarly, the heated debate in Washington about "welfare re-
form" is the result of generalized frustration and impatience with
the ability of government to intervene in the personal behavior of
individuals. As a result, proposals that arise in Congress are likely
to be designed as a reaction to current arrangements; they are not
likely to be a response to the lessons learned from the welfare sys-
tem, to increase the incomes of women with children or to expand
their economic participation.
1. Geeta Anand, Framingham Hopefuls Take Aim at Town's Social-Service Costs,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1995 ("[Clritics have called welfare mothers a symbol of
what's gone wrong with America .... ."); Lynne Duke, Benefits and Doubts, WASH.
POST, Feb. 26, 1995, Magazine at 12 ("[W]elfare has become a symbol of what's wrong
with America.").
2. Nina J. Easton, Merchants of Virtue, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, Magazine at
16 ("This may be the decade of consensus that the welfare state isn't working, even,
perhaps that it undermines a sense of responsibility."); Nate Smith, "One in a Million;
Why I'm Going on the Million-Man March-and Why It's a Positive Event," Pirrs.
POST-GAzETTE, Oct. 7, 1995, at A7 ("[W]elfare handout[s] ... undermine[ ] personal
initiative.").
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Though changes emerging in social policy appear startling in
their vehemence and single-mindedness, their antecedents have
been present throughout the history of American social policy de-
bates. The impulse to place responsibility for economic outcomes
solely on the individual, however, is at odds with much of what
recent research has shown about the principal causes of declining
incomes and the failure of individuals to overcome them.3 Re-
search on the most recently enacted legislative and administrative
innovations in welfare suggests that it is unreasonable to expect
restricting benefits or increasing work demands alone to signifi-
cantly alter the size of welfare caseloads or the incomes of recipi-
ents. The most recent reform proposals,4 which restrict benefits
and eligibility, only punish those who cannot compete in a chang-
ing economic environment and promises to reduce the well being
of those struggling to participate in it. Effective policy must deal
realistically with the profound societal changes and economic re-
structuring that explains the shifting behavioral and economic pat-
terns of the last two decades.
This Essay explains the evolution of various approaches toward
welfare, assesses the most recent reform efforts under the Family
Support Act 5 and reviews the principal findings of welfare research
to evaluate the success of alternative program strategies. Ulti-
mately, the goal of this Essay is to assess the value of the current
welfare reform proposals. Part I explains the evolution of various
approaches toward welfare over the last thirty years. Part II de-
scribes the most recent reforms instituted in 1988 and reviews the
dynamics of welfare caseloads and benefits over the past few de-
cades in light of the concurrent changes in the economic and social
environment. Part III reviews the research findings in welfare re-
form's critical areas: those efforts (i) that seek to alter benefit
structures and eligibility and (ii) those that seek to alter fertility
behavior through both incentive and punitive models. Both areas
show the limited potential of current proposals to alter existing
caseload patterns. Part IV examines the research on the welfare-
to-work programs that formed the basis for the Family Support
Act. Part V reviews the findings from qualitative studies of welfare
3. See infra part II.
4. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (House version); Work Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (Senate version).
5. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 602, et seq.) [hereinafter Family Support Act].
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recipients themselves, attempting to enrich the understanding of
the factors that explain their behavior. Part VI describes and ana-
lyzes the most recent experiences and designs of state-level welfare
reform programs that, anticipating most federal proposals, empha-
size restricting benefits and eligibility, imposing time limits and
punishing early childbearing and additional births. Part VII uses
the review of both the research evidence and the description of the
most recent reform proposals to reflect on the likely impact of such
reform. This Essay concludes with a pessimistic appraisal of the
recent proposals' potential for success because they fail to respond
to the underlying problems that keep welfare recipients poor: low-
wages; poor and unstable jobs; and inadequate skills.
I. The Evolution of Approaches Toward Welfare
In the United States, the welfare system is a broad array of mul-
tiple programs with overlapping mandates and complex, poorly co-
ordinated rules about eligibility, benefit levels and administrative
arrangements. The system includes cash assistance,6 food stamps,7
housing assistance 8 and Medicaid. 9 The most prominent welfare
program is Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),"°
which operates under federal guidelines and a jointly funded ar-
rangement by states and the federal government.'" Developed as
part of the Social Security Act of 1935,2 AFDC remains the major
income assistance program serving poor families.' 3 It is a categori-
cal program, largely made up of cash grants, some social services
and, more recently, employment and education services. AFDC
has always been somewhat ill-suited to play the role it has been
required to play over the last sixty years. Historically viewed as a
program for the unemployable,' 4 AFDC has awkwardly shifted to
6. See, e.g., Social Security Act of 1994, subch. XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (codifica-
tion of supplemental security income).
7. Food Stamp Act of 1994, 7 U.S.C. § 2011.
8. E.g., Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
9. Social Security Act of 1967, subch. XIX, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994).
10. Social Security Act of 1967, subch. XVIII, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
11. Social Security Act of 1967, subch. XVIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1994).
12. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
13. Richard Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, 30 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 3 (1992).
14. The able-bodied employable poor - largely understood to be male heads of
household and individuals - were historically ineligible for public assistance. Local
administration and benefit levels supported a view that local jurisdictions knew more
about the needs of their clients and the needs of local labor markets. The denial of
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respond to the needs of a changing caseload under shifting eco-
nomic conditions and social expectations. 15
States developed their own public assistance programs that they
administer under federally established limitations and regulations
in exchange for federal matching funds. 16 The federal matching
funds vary according to a formula that includes a consideration of
state income.17 State AFDC programs vary dramatically from state
to state, with benefit levels varying widely across the nation. For
example, the maximum monthly benefits for a family of three in
Mississippi is $120; in Alaska it is $975.18 Though the original em-
phasis was on providing a social safety net for women left to care
for children with no breadwinner, benefits have always been low,
and public skepticism about the size and character of societal com-
mitment has always been high.19 Over time, widows and orphans
came increasingly to represent a smaller and smaller portion of the
welfare caseload.20 When widows and orphans were replaced by
divorced, abandoned or never-married mothers and the size of the
caseload began to rise in the late 1960s, the first rumblings of legis-
lative debate expressing discontent with the form and incentives of
AFDC programs could be heard. 1
A. Evolution of Approaches: Rehabilitation, Work Incentives
and Poverty Reduction
The two-and-a-half decades preceding the Family Support Act of
198822 (the most recently enacted welfare legislation), witnessed an
benefits to able bodied men insured that labor supply would be available and assist-
ance levels would never compete with or drive up local wage rates. Women with chil-
dren were thought to be needed at home for child care and thus were not seen as
employable. See generally LESTER SALAMON, WELFARE: THE ELUSIVE CONSENSUS:
WHERE WE ARE, How WE GOT THERE 71 (1978).
15. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA xi (1986).
16. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-291 to 295 (1988 & Supp. 1995); CAL.
WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 11200-11514 (Deering 1991 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-4-100 to 119 (1994 & Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-4-201 to 720
(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10-1 to -33 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. SOC. SERV.
LAW §§ 343-62 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-249-274.10
(Michie 1995).
17. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 15.
18. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
WHERE YOUR MONEY GOES: THE 1994-1995 GREEN BOOK 366 (1994) [hereinafter
GREEN BOOK].
19. See generally KATZ, supra note 15, at 68.
20. See KATZ, supra note 15, at 66-78.
21. Id.
22. See Family Support Act, supra note 5.
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ongoing national debate on welfare.23 The debate was character-
ized by continually shifting views and ideological emphases. These
shifts fueled a series of policy and legislative initiatives that re-
sponded to the changing composition, and rapid increase in the
size, of the AFDC caseload.24
During the 1960s, a range of legislative changes sought to pro-
vide social and rehabilitative services to aid single-parent families
and to reduce what was thought to be a growing "culture of pov-
erty."'25 . In addition, in response to the concern that the method of
calculating benefits produced strong disincentives for women to
work, legislation passed in 1967 provided an economic work incen-
tive.2 6 Instead of reducing a woman's benefits by one dollar for
each dollar she earned, the new legislation permitted a recipient to
retain the first thirty dollars of her earnings each month as well as
one-third of her remaining earnings before AFDC benefits were
reduced.27 This legislation also required women with children over
six years old to register for work and training opportunities under
the Work Incentive Program (WIN).28
Though a prevailing unease about both the increasing numbers
of single mothers and the role that work ought to play in reducing
the welfare rolls and increasing incomes existed, initiatives to re-
duce poverty and raise benefit levels continued to surface over the
next twenty-five years.29 The most successful efforts where those
that created in-kind benefits-often tied to welfare-to improve
living standards.30 Food stamps, Medicaid and housing subsidies
23. Susan Kellam, Welfare Experiments, 4 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY RE-
SEARCHER 799-803 (1994).
24. See KATZ, supra note 15, at 251-272.
25. An example of the "culture of poverty" from that era can be found in the work
Of OSCAR LEWIS, THE CHILDREN OF SANCHEZ: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A MEXICAN
FAMILY (1961) and, more recently, in the work of WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1987). They argue that a culture of poverty locates the behavior of the poor in re-
sponse to restricted opportunities and limited expectations for self improvement as
producing a culture capable of perpetuating hopelessness, lack of incentive and per-
verse adaptation to the realities of continued poverty.
26. Work Incentive Program, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1995).
27. Id. § 602(a)(7)(D)(3).
28. Id § 602(a)(7)(D)(19)(C)(II). The benefit calculation changes were seen as a
way to make work opportunities more attractive in comparison to welfare.
29. See KArz, supra note 15, at 254-73.
30. The inclusion of these additional benefits in the welfare package also re-
sponded to the concerns of those who saw inequities in the disparate standards of
need identified by each state's program. Since food stamps are fully federally funded
and are calculated for each family on their income including welfare, recipients in
lower paying states could close the gap in their AFDC benefit levels somewhat since
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and their continued growth over the period, served to improve the
economic well being of poor families, even though these programs
increased the difference between the value of the welfare package
and the net value of wages these women could otherwise earn. Be-
cause all three programs served some additional populations as
well-especially the working and elderly poor-the burgeoning
cost of these programs contributed significantly to public
misgivings.31
Until recently, welfare reform strategies were fueled by the goal
of reducing poverty and improving the material well-being of recip-
ients on the one hand, and the goal of increasing the work efforts
of the poor and reducing program caseloads and budgets on the
other.32 In part, these competing motivations were the result of the
conflicting views about the causes of poverty and welfare depen-
dency.33 Those that viewed welfare recipients as largely the victims
of circumstances who needed time and support to get their lives
together sought to reduce poverty and increase the well-being of
recipients through (i) increased benefits, (ii) reduction of complex-
ity in the welfare system and (iii) improved access to services.34
Early research on caseload dynamics paints a picture consistent
with this view. 35
Those that held the alternative view, that welfare recipients were
mired in the culture of poverty, unwilling or unable to become self-
sufficient, emphasized proposals that (i) reduced work disincen-
tives from benefit packages that compete with wages and (ii) made
income support conditioned on mandatory job search, training or
public work.36
Three approaches over the last two decades tried unsuccessfully
to resolve these competing visions and objectives. President
Nixon's Family Assistance Plan sought to make benefit levels and
they would be eligible for proportionately more in food stamps than a similar family
in a higher paying state. Thus these programs served somewhat to reduce benefit
disparities among states. The effect was however to reward lower paying states since
every dollar of state increase of AFDC would reduce the federal share of Food Stamp
costs.
31. See generally Moffitt, supra note 13, at 1-3.
32. Id. at 37-40.
33. Id. at 40-56.
34. See generally MARY B. SANGER, WELFARE OF THE POOR (1979).
35. P. RYDELL ET AL., WELFARE CASELOAD DYNAMICS IN NEW YORK CITY, tbls.
5.5 & 5.6 at 61-62 (1974); and GREG J. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF
PLENTY (1984).
36. See generally Work Incentive Program, supra note 26.
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eligibility uniform nationwide and to reduce family dissolution in-
centives by extending eligibility to two-parent poor families. 37
Similarly, President Carter's Program for Better Jobs and In-
come also sought to insure uniform national benefits and eligibility
for two-parent families; however, in response to concerns about la-
bor supply, his administration also developed a complex system of
variable entitlement and work obligations to deal differently with
those "expected" to work and those "not expected" to work.38 The
Carter plan included a federal jobs program to provide public em-
ployment as a last resort.39 The plan's size, administrative require-
ments and program costs ultimately undermined its enactment.4 0
President Reagan's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act suc-
ceeded in becoming law in 1981. 1 It represented an effort to re-
duce program costs and caseload size with little concern about
work-incentive effects.42 It made dramatic changes in the methods
of calculating benefits and the income ceiling for eligibility.43 Fur-
ther, it encouraged considerable experimentation in the design of
state programs by allowing waivers from federal requirements. 44
All of these proposals reflected conflicting impulses and differing
underlying philosophies about the causes of welfare dependency,
the relative importance of anti-poverty goals and the role the fed-
eral government should play in formulating solutions to poverty.
37. Susan Kellam, Welfare Experiments, 4 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER 795, 800 (1994).
But fears about labor supply effects and competing views about the adequacy of maxi-
mum benefits defeated any compromise. While the Family Assistance Plan was de-
feated, additional programs developed as part of a more general antipoverty strategy
survived. The Food Stamp Program provided a negative income tax in the form of
vouchers for food and extended eligibility to any family unit eligible on the basis of
income. Its continual growth over the decades has made it an import income supple-
ment to both welfare eligible and the working poor. The Supplemental Security in-
come program also survived and consolidated several categorical program with
differing eligibility and benefit levels. It provides a cash grant adjusted by income to
blind, disabled and elderly recipients not eligible under existing programs. See
SALAMON, supra note 14, at 93-97.
38. Mary Bryna Sanger, Will Carter's Welfare Reform Program Reform Welfare?
Evidence From Empirical Research, 8 J. OF SOCIOLOGY & SOCIAL WELFARE 31, 43
(1980).
39. Id. at 49.
40. Id. at 66.
41. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 9-35 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
42. See David Stoesz, POOR POLICY: THE LEGACY OF THE KERNER COMMISSION
FOR SOCIAL WELFARE, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1675, 1680 (1993).
43. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (Supp. 1981) with 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)
(1976).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988 and Supp. 1993).
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Thus, when Senator Moynihan's Family Support Act45 became
law in 1988, with bipartisan support, it was hailed as having
achieved a new national consensus. 6 Described as "the most
sweeping overhaul of the nation's welfare system in half a cen-
tury 47 and as a redefinition of the social contract,48 the FSA and
the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS)
contained within it, are now slated for the trash heap under
promises by President Clinton to "change welfare as we know it"149
and by the new Republican majority in their Contract with
America.5°
II. What Has Happened Since 1988: Assessing the Last Round
of Reform Efforts
A. The Family Support Act and Its Impact on State Welfare
Systems
The FSA represents a profound shift in the relationship between
welfare recipients and the state because it established reciprocity in
the extension of benefits: in exchange for income support, the em-
ployment and training section of the FSA requires recipients to
make efforts to become self-sufficient. 51 The JOBS program re-
quires employable recipients to search for employment or invest in
their own employability through training, education or work expe-
rience.52 Further, it requires states to provide a specific range of
employment and training services to at least a minimum proportion
of employable recipients and to target expenditures to certain
groups.53 The target groups are those for whom the threat of long-
term dependency is most acute. They include: (i) young unmar-
ried mothers who have not finished high school or have little or no
45. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. i00-485, 100th Congress, 2d sess. (Oct. 13,
1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
46. See Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 457, 479-83 (1988).
47. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT (Oct. 8, 1988) at 2825.
48. Irene Lurie & Mary Bryna Sanger, The Family Support Act: Redefinihg the
Social Contract in New York, 1991 SOCIAL SERVICE REVIEW 43, 44 (1991).
49. Eric Pianin, Tenet of Clinton Welfare Plan Faces Test, Group of Liberal House
Democrats Seeks Flexibility in Two Years and Out Proposal, WASH. POST, May 20,
1994, at A6.
50. HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, LEGISLATIVE
DIGEST (Sept. 27, 1994).
51. See generally Family Support Act.
52. Id. § 602(a)(19)(A); § 682(a)(1)(A).
53. Id § 682(a)(1).
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recent work experience; (ii) those whose welfare tenure was for
thirty-six of the previous last sixty months;54 and (iii) mothers
whose eligibility will be lost within two years because their young-
est child will become too old for assistance. 5 The FSA mandates
require states to provide support services, such as day care, trans-
portation and continued eligibility for Medicaid for one year after
the start of employment.5 6 Services, including cash assistance, so-
cial services, employment and training as well as education and job
placement services, are required to be coordinated by a single state
agency. 7
Virtually all states met initial mandated participation rates
through 1993.58 States failed to use outcome-based measures for
evaluating their programs as a whole, though.5 9 As a result, it is
difficult to assess the overall success of the program with confi-
dence. Nevertheless, recent research on specific state programs,
provides a picture of predictable and modest, but generally posi-
tive, impacts on unemployment.6 °
Most, troubling is that despite more favorable federal matching
rates,61 all the available federal funds allocated for state matches
have not been spent.62 This suggests that severe budgetary con-
straints facing states have played a significant role in restricting
54. These are the groups whose characteristics make them likely to benefit from
the program. See Erica B. Baum, When the Witch Doctors Agree: The Family Support
Act and Social Science Research, 10 J. OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 603,
612 (1991).
55. The Family Support Act requires states to reach two levels of accomplishment:
participation rates and targeting. Failure to achieve proscribed levels results in re-
duced federal matching rates to 50% (from 60-80% depending upon state per capita
income). Irene Lurie, Jobs Implementation: Building Capacity and Encouraging Per-
formance, 2 (October 27-29, 1994) (unpublished manuscript of a paper prepared for
the Annual Conference of Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management)
(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id. at 5-6.
58. See generally Lurie, supra note 55, at 7; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
WELFARE TO WORK: JOBS PARTICIPATION RATE DATA UNRELIABLE FOR ASSESS-
ING STATES' PERFORMANCE (1993). Although a 1983 General Accounting Office
study and other analysis suggest that the state methods of calculation for 1991 were
neither accurate nor comparably derived and therefore do not provide a fair basis for
assessing states' participation rates. Id.
59. See Lurie, supra note 55, at 8.
60. See generally part III.
61. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JOBS AND JTPA: TRACK-
ING SPENDING, OUTCOMES, AND PROGRAM PERFORMANCE (July 1994).
62. Id.
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program investment.63 It is important to recognize this fact when
evaluating the likely impacts from any new initiative whose pro-
gram funding relies to a great extent on state capacity and
commitment.
The research on the FSA shows that the outcomes have not been
very different from the expectations. States complying with federal
mandates have been able to enroll recipients and to provide a
range of job placement, employment, training and education serv-
ices to high-risk groups. 64 In a number of the sites that were stud-
ied, participants experienced improved earnings, increased labor
force participation and modestly reduced welfare grants.65 Overall,
caseload sizes were not significantly reduced; nor were welfare
budgets.66 Research prior to program implementation, however,
provided no expectations for quick or dramatic changes in recipi-
ent well-being or caseload reductions.67
Despite these facts, the desire to alter dramatically the nature
and character of "reform" is becoming more radical and aggres-
sive. The current debate does not question the FSA's underlying
shift in expectations about recipients and the obligation for recipi-
ents to help themselves. It questions the obligations of the state.
Even Democrat reforms seek to limit significantly the length and
scale of state support and investments on behalf of recipients.68
The result is a debate focused almost exclusively on determining
the precise bounds of state responsibilities and on the severity of
the demands placed on recipients.
The frustration with the failure of existing policies evident in
those debates emanates from an overly simplistic notion of what
can move large numbers of women from welfare to work and from
a misunderstanding of the current relationships of welfare mothers
to the labor market. It reveals a backlash among the working poor
and those households who find it increasingly difficult to sustain a
middle-class life. Finally, it reflects an unwillingness and inability
of the federal and state governments to sustain current levels of
welfare spending in times of growing fiscal stress.69
63. See Mary Bryna Sanger, The Inherent Contradiction of Welfare Reform, 18
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL 663, 668 (1990).
64. Id. at 669.
65. Id. at 670.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 670-672.
68. Id. at 672-674.
69. Pressure for budget control requires hard choices among competing interests.
Popular villains are always sought. Those who are not well-organized and for whom
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Current policy surrounding welfare reform emphasizes the fail-
ure of individuals and the role of government in exacerbating these
failures.70 These policies do not consider, nor address the impact
of structural changes in the economy, such as employment and
wage levels. The current emphasis is on reducing the negative be-
havioral incentives implicit in social program design. The most im-
portant targets are undesirable social acts such as early and out-of-
wedlock childbearing, failure to complete high school and lack of
employment.7 '
B. Caseloads and Benefits 1975-93
The size and composition of the AFDC caseload flucutates with
changes in the economy. Welfare rolls decline with increasing
levels of employment during periods of growth and increase correl-
atively during periods of economic downturns.72 A 1993 Congres-
sional Budget Office Study on the determinants of caseload change
estimates that more than a quarter of the caseload increase be-
tween 1989 and 1992 could be attributed to the prolonged eco-
nomic downturn. 73 One-half of the increase can also be explained
by increases in the number of female-headed families.74
In inflation adjusted dollars, total AFDC expenditures have re-
mained relatively stable since 1975. In contrast, the average mon-
thly benefits per family has fallen from $576 per family in 1975 to
there has traditionally been suspicion and mistrust have provided a convenient target
for frustration and blame. See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1992). Wefare recipients, whose public face is black, provide a particulary visible and
focused symbol for the assault on all that is wrong with public policy because their
presence on welfare is more often than not the result of early childbearing, failure to
marry, and failure to complete high school. See DAVE M. O'NEILL & JUNE E.
O'NEILL, IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING SYSTEMS OF A TIME LIM-
ITED WELFARE REFORM INITIATIVE 23, tbl. 11 (July 1994) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with THE Fordham Urban Law Journal) (demonstrating that while only 39.1%
of AFDC women in 1978 were black, they represented 49% of those who spent four
or more years on welfare by 1989. This compares with whites who represented 51.4%
of the caseload in 1978, but only 44.9% of the long term stayers over the period).
70. See generally Lucy Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media
Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159 (1995).
71. Id. at 1163-68.
72. Rebecca M. Blank, The Employment Strategy: Public Policies to Increase Work
and Earnings, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 168 (Shel-
don Danziger et al. eds., 1994).
73. Memorandum from Janice Peskin, Forecasting AFDC Caseloads with an Em-
phasis on Economic Factors, Congressional Budget Office (1993) (on file with the
author).
74. Id.
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$373 in 1993-a fall in value of 35%.75 Over the same period, the
national AFDC caseload grew by two and a half million recipients,
from 11.1 million in 1975 to 13.6 million in 1992.76
The true value of the benefit package available to recipients in-
cludes not only AFDC cash payments but food stamps and Medi-
caid as well. 77 Medicaid is the fastest growing part of the means-
tested federal budget. The number of Medicaid recipients has in-
creased from 22 million in 1975 to 30.9 million in 1992 - nearly a
50% increase. 78 Total Medicaid expenditures have grown dramati-
cally from $12.6 billion in 1975 to $152.3 billion in 1994, even
though they do not accrue to families in the form of increases in
cash. The growth of expenditures reflects the increase in the costs
of medical services. Most of the dramatic increase in Medicaid,
however, is not attributable to the AFDC caseload but to increas-
ing costs of supporting an increasingly elderly population, espe-
cially for home and long-term care.79
The number of food stamp recipients has grown from $16.3 in
1975 to $27 million in 1993. In inflation adjusted dollars, average
monthly benefits per person increased 36% over the same period
from $50 in 1975 to $68 in 1993, and total expenditures in constant
dollars increased from $10.9 million in 1975 to $24.8 in 1993-a
140% increase in real dollars.80 In contrast to Medicaid, food
stamps can accrue to any income-eligible individual or family and
are thus highly responsive to changes in the economy.8 ' The in-
crease in food stamp expenditures from 1975 to 1993 reflects both
increased welfare participation and an increase in the level of
benefits.
The growth in the total size of the welfare "package" is relevant
because most critics point to the increasing difference between
what recipients can bundle in their welfare package and what they
can generate from employment.82 In real terms, however, the com-
75. GREEN BOOK, supra note 18, at 325.
76. Id.
77. In addition one-quarter of AFDC households nationally receive some rent
subsidy or public housing. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 18, at 806, 807, 905.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 782.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. The combined AFDC and Food Stamps benefit for a family of four (a typical
family is a three person family) represents a little more than 50% of average full-time
earnings for a high school graduate, and about 70% for those with 1-3 years of high
school. See O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69, at 14, fig. 7.
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bined value of the package peaked in 1972-76 and has declined
ever since.83
C. Family Composition
-As early as the 1960s, AFDC was increasingly recognized as be-
coming a program that supported divorced, abandoned, and never-
married mothers.84 There has been an increase in never-married
mothers, especially teenagers giving birth out-of-wedlock. 85 The
societal consequences of this phenomenon are significant.86
Though birth rates are down, even for poor women, the proportion
of births to unmarried women as a percentage of all births has been
growing.87
Teenage childbearing, especially to single mothers, dramatically
affects the economic well-being of children and their families. It
also increases the probability that a family will have to resort to
welfare as a means of support, and even develop long-term depen-
dence on public assistance. 88 The resulting consequence of teenage
parenthood is that 50% of all teenage mothers, and 77% of those
who were unmarried when they gave, birth, end up on welfare
within five years of becoming a parent.89
83. Id. at 12.
84. By 1983, Mary Jo Bane & David Ellwood's cohort analysis of welfare receipt
over time identified that 75% of new recipient starts on AFDC were associated with
divorce (45%) or the birth of a child to an unmarried woman (30%). MARY Jo BANE
& DAVID T. ELLWOOD, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE DYNAMICS
OF DEPENDENCE: ROUTE TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY (1983).
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Research by the Alan Guttmacher Institute shows that, in particular, the
percentage of first births that occur out-of-wedlock to teenagers has increased dra-
matically since the early 1960s. Births to teenagers (women aged 15-17) increased
from 33% in the early 1960s to 81% in the late 1980s. A. Bachu, Fertility of American
Women: June 1990, 452 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 7, tbl. (1991).
88. See Christine Nord et al., Consequences of Teenage Parenting, 62 JOURNAL OF
SCHOOL HEALTH 310 (1992); J. Grogger & S. Bronars, The Socioeconomic Conse-
quences of Teenaged Childbearing: Findings From A National Experiment, 25 FAMILY
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 156 (1993); Saul Hoffman et al., Reevaluating The Costs of
Teenage Childbearing, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 1 (1993). Examination of an analysis using
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth indicates that approximately 48% of the
teenage mothers received at least one month of welfare in the first year following the
birth compared to 7% of those who were married. O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note
69.
89. Rebecca Maynard, The Effectiveness Of Intervention Aimed At Reducing
The Incidence Of Teenage Pregnancy and Mitigating The Consequences Of Early
Childbearing 2 (Oct. 1995) (paperpresented at the Annual Research Conference of
the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management) (on fie with the author).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
In addition, recidivism is particularly high for this group.9° The
social costs associated with the high incidence of poverty and wel-
fare participation among teenage parents is very costly to the State.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the social costs of
teenage childbearing are over $22 billion a year solely for the ma-
jor income social support programs.91
Although it is hard to separate the role that early school failures
play in inducing early child bearing, early childbearing clearly
reduces opportunities for the teenage mothers to obtain subse-
quent education and interferes with the acquisition of employment.
Thus, teenage childbearing, particularly among unmarried adoles-
cents, is significantly related to poverty and severely restricted life
chances. Its relationship to welfare receipt and long-term depen-
dence cannot be understated.
D. AFDC Caseload Dynamics, Experiences and Heterogeneity
Historically, the conventional wisdom held that the welfare
caseload is relatively static. Most recipients were thought to expe-
rience long-term stays and dependence. 92 More recent opportuni-
ties to follow long-term welfare recipients, using longitudinal data,
have permitted a more sophisticated analysis of the actual exper-
iences of the caseload. The results draw a picture of a relatively
heterogeneous caseload that is quite different from what might be
concluded from a snapshot of the characteristics of the caseload at
a single point in time. Cross-sectional surveys-snapshots-tend
to over-represent long-term stayers and are unable to explore the
mobility of cases over time.
Early studies by Mary Jo Bane and David J. Ellwood show that
most recipients stay on welfare for short periods of time, but that
long-term stayers make up a significant minority of the rolls at any
point in time and account for a disproportionate amount of welfare
expenditures.93 More recent studies, however, draw a picture of
families, many of whom have multiple spells of welfare depen-
dence, even if many of the experiences are relatively short.94 When
multiple experiences are taken into account, Ellwood found that
90. Id. (noting that more than 70% of those teenage parents who are able to es-
cape welfare return again within three years); see also Gleason Philip et al., The Dy-
namics Of AFDC Spells Among Teenage Parents (Jan. 1994) (paper presented at the
Econometrics Society Meeting) (on file with the author).
91. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PROGRAMS FOR TEENAGE PARENTS (1990)
92. See MARY BRYNA SANGER, WELFARE OF THE POOR 1-14 (1979).
93. See BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 84, at ii.
94. See generally O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69.
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30% of welfare recipients receive benefits, aggregated for 1-2
years, 20% for 3-4 years, and 19% for 5-7 years.9 5 Thirty percent
receive benefits for eight or more years.96 Thus, it becomes clear
that patterns of welfare use vary dramatically and the seriousness
and significance of welfare dependence is not the same for all wo-
men.97 To the degree that women are short-term stayers (two years
or less on the rolls), they have fewer handicaps.98
E. Changing Labor Market Opportunities: Jobs and Wages
Though growing numbers of out-of-wedlock births to young
mothers are a source of the increase in caseload growth, changes
over the last decade in the labor market have had a greater impact
on caseload size and mobility. Structural changes in the labor mar-
ket and constricted wages affect employment opportunities for
low-skilled workers.99 Even though overall unemployment has de-
clined, teenage unemployment remains high.100 In addition, while
aggregate employment has increased, the quality of the jobs being
created is deteriorating. Growing numbers of low-wage jobs have
few benefits and offer little training opportunities. Such jobs pro-
vide low-skilled workers with families decreased opportunities for
long-term economic independence. Even full-time employment in
these jobs does not insure wages above the family poverty line.101
In addition, inflation-adjusted wages for low-skilled workers
have fallen and income inequality both within and between differ-
ent skill-level groups has increased. Growing numbers of low-wage
95. See generally DAVID T. ELLWOOD, MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH,
TARGETING 'WOULD BE' LONG-TERM RECIPIENTS OF AFDC (1986).
96. Id.
97. See generally BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 84. These findings are not sur-
prising given the variation in education, childbearing and employment experiences of
the caseload.
98. O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69, at 28. A recent study using both the data
from the Current Population Survey and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
illustrate these differences. Id. The study looked at women on AFDC in 1989 who
had come on the rolls at some point since 1978. Short-term stayers had more work
experience prior to coming on welfare, had fewer children, and had somewhat (but
not significantly so) better skills when compared with long-term stayers. Id. Skills
were based on scores derived from the Armed Forces Qualifications Test. Id. at 25.
Long-term stayers were more likely to have dropped out of high school and have had
a birth out-of-wedlock as a teenager. Id. at 25-26, tbl. 14.
99. See Blank, supra note 72, at 171-178.
100. Id. at 170.
101. In 1989, a single mother with two children needed about $15,000 to stay out of
poverty. Less than half the women aged 25-34 who worked in 1989 earned that much.
Christopher Jencks & Katherine Edin, Do Poor Women Have a Right to Bear Chil-
dren? 20 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT 43, 45 (1995).
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job seekers, international competition, and the weakening role of
unions have all led to reduced wages and increased wage inequality
for workers.10 2 While women's wages (as compared with men's)
have not experienced as significant a decline, the wages for women
without a high school diploma still average only 58% of compara-
bly educated men.0 3
Women's economic investment in marriage, is clearly affected by
the declining income prospects of their potential husbands as
well.' °4 Public policy discussions, however, have focused less on
the fathers of welfare children than on requiring their mothers to
work. This is true despite the fact that the FSA provides strong
mandates for states to establish paternity and encourages aggres-
sive pursuit of child support. 0 5 Child support payments are one
potential source of improving the economic prospects of welfare
women dependent on low-wage employment. 10 6 Thus, declining
wages and job opportunities for men may adversely affect welfare
women.
Finally, increased rates of poverty over the last decade are the
result of structural changes in the labor market. The distribution of
earnings increasingly reflects the distribution of formal education.
This disparity negatively impacts a large percentage of the welfare
caseload,0 7 especially because the recipients with a high school
equivalency diploma have been shown to fare no better than high
school dropouts. 0 8 The gap in earnings between more and less ed-
ucated workers is increasing and the standard of living of a large
proportion of workers has steadily declined.' 0 9 These outcomes
coupled with the increase in the numbers of female-headed fami-
102. See Blank, supra note 72, at 168-169.
103. Id. at 173.
104. Much debate surrounds the thesis advanced by William Wilson, which states
that increases in out-of-wedlock births are related to women's choices of suitable mar-
riage partners. See generally WILSON, supra note 25.
105. See generally Family Support Act.
106. See Derek Cheek, Child Support Hammer a Hard Sell; Dead Beats Would Lose
All Licenses, THE TENNESSEAN, Dec. 31, 1995, at lB.
107. Most recent data shows that 23.7% welfare recipients, lack a high school di-
ploma and that 22.4% have no schooling after high school. See CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY RESEARCHER supra note 47, at 811 n.1.
108. Id
109. See generally Barry Bluestone, The Inequality Express, 20 THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT 81 (1995); Lawrence Mishel & Jared Bernstein, The State of Working
America, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (1993); Frank Levy & Richard Murnane, U.S.
Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review of Recent Trends and Proposed
Explanations, in JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE (1992).
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lies"' have contributed to rising caseloads. This is so even though
the real wages of low-skilled female workers have not declined as
steeply since 1979 as men's.11 Thus, a complex series of social and
economic forces have contributed to increased dependence on
welfare.
I. Lessons from States' Efforts Since 1988: Research and the
Design of Reform
The ongoing welfare reform debate rests on several key, but con-
tested assumptions about the flaws of the current AFDC program,
and the relationship of these flaws to growing levels of welfare de-
pendency. These assumptions are: (i) that the design of the sys-
tem-its eligibility rules and benefit determination formulae-
encourages perverse behavior by rewarding it;" 2 (ii) that open-
ended entitlement inhibits efforts to achieve independence because
it suppresses the need for independence;"13 (iii) that the program
rewards socially undesirable family decision-making regarding
childbearing and child support by indemnifying potential parents
for the risks they take;" 4 and (iv) that comparison of the size of the
benefit package and the costs of going to work provide strong work
disincentives. " 5 Researchers evaluating recent state experiments
under the JOBS program and federal waivers are testing these
assumptions.
More fundamentally, current discussions assume that the expec-
tation of self-sufficiency is necessary to motivate socially desirable
behavior and to provide incentives for work." 6 This assumption is
at the heart of reform proposals that stress a need to return to
traditional American values of individual responsibility, self-reli-
ance and hard work. 1 7 The very existence of an entitlement that
provides support for those who fail is commonly held to undermine
110. See notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
111. Id.
112. Jason DeParle, When Giving Up Welfare for a Job Just Doesn't Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 1992, at Al, A12.
113. See Michael Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Prepared Statement
Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, House Ways and Means Committee,
FED. NEWS SERV. (Jan. 13, 1995).
114. See Martha Minow, The Day, Barry, and Howard Visiting Scholar: The Wel-
fare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 817, 823 (1994).
115. DeParle, supra note 112, at Al.
116. Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: the Wel-
fare Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 235, 314.
117. See generally Personal Responsibility Act, § 401(2) (1995).
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these values. Thus, the role and structure of social protection itself
are the subjects of critical review.
The most recent legislative initiatives are designed to achieve
political objectives more than to insure policy outcomes. Investi-
gating what we know about different work and welfare programs
provides a basis for predicting the likely impacts of current propos-
als on the poor. 118
The following section summarizes the research on various wel-
fare reform strategies, including those that alter benefit levels and
eligibility, those designed to change behavior, and those that alter
incentives for work and job training. The research suggests the
possibilities and limits of competing strategies relevant to the cur-
rent debate.
A. Strategies that Alter Benefits or Change Eligibility Rules
Manipulation of benefit levels and eligibility rules are two areas
that intuitively appeal to policy-makers seeking to reduce welfare
participation. These are significant features of current state experi-
ments' 19 and are central to federal reform efforts as well.120
Programs that manipulate benefit levels in hopes of changing the
behavior of welfare recipients are predicated on economic theories
that posits that economically rational individuals buy more of
everything as their income increases, including leisure. Thus, if an
individual's non-work income rises, there is less incentive to gener-
ate wage income. Conversely, lowering benefit levels increases the
recipient's incentive to participate in the labor market.
Benefit formulas for income support programs also include an
implicit tax rate - or benefit reduction rate - that reduces bene-
fits as income from work increases. A given benefit level com-
bined with a benefit reduction rate determins the level of income at
which benefits fall to zero and program eligibility ends. The bene-
118. It might be argued that tight budgets, economic competition, falling wages and
worsening living standards have precipitated a practical, rather than a philosophical,
crisis. Yet, inherent tensions between competing values have always characterized
American social policy. KATZ, supra note 15, at 126; FRANCES F. PRIVEN & RICHARD
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1993).
While the drama created by the apparent national mandate resulting from the 1994
elections is real, the underlying debate about the role of the State and the responsibil-
ities of individuals is a familiar American theme with dozens of historical examples.
Id. at 8-22
119. For example, Arkansas, Georgia, New Jersey and Wisconsin all limit or even
end benefit increases for additional children. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY RE-
SEARCHER, supra note 47, at 804, tbl. I.
120. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility Act, § 101; Work Opportunity Act, § 101(b).
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fit reduction rate measures the incremental reward an individual
will enjoy from increased hours of work. Current rules impose a
100% rate on recipients after four months of employment and im-
pose an overall ceiling of 150% of a state's standard of need for
continued eligibility. Theoretically, manipulating benefit reduction
rates can have an ambiguous result.12a A rise in a tax rate can be
seen as decreasing the rewards from work and, thus, making leisure
cheaper - and more attractive. In contrast, it can be seen as re-
ducing total income, which results in decreasing purchases of all
things - including leisure. Thus, one effect would decrease incen-
tives to work and the other would increase it.
Finally, programs can simply change eligibility requirments mak-
ing previously eligible categories ineligible. Income cutoffs can be
used - such as the 150% of the state standard of need in OBRA.'
In that case, individuals, who might otherwise be eligible on the
basis of the benefit formula alone, might be dropped from the roles
when their income reached a certain level. Similarly, a state might
simply exclude a category of recipient - illegal immigrant, teenag-
ers bearing children out of wedlock, or those who will not or can-
not comply with program rules. The goal might be to change
incentives or simply to reduce costs and caseloads.
Considerable research has been undertaken of the actual im-
pacts of changes in benefit levels, tax rates and eligibility rules.1 22
It has been done over long periods of time using different data ba-
ses and research designs, and controlling for different variables.
Researchers studying participation rates within and across states
have found that benefit and eligibility manipulation within existing
ranges (either by increasing or decreasing the grant) does little to
decrease overall welfare participation or to increase labor market
participation.12 3
121. Moffit, supra note 123, at 8-10.
122. See generally Sheldon Danziger et al., How Income Transfer Programs Affect
Work, Savings, and the Income Distribution: A Critical Review, 19 JOURNAL OF Eco-
NOMIC LITERATURE 975 (1981); Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare
System: A Review, 30 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 1 (1992). Both articles
provide a systematic and critical review of the relevant literature.
123. The participation rates were compared within and across states associated with
either variations in or changes to benefit levels or benefit reduction rates. See Moffitt,
supra note 123, at 31-36.
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1. Earnings Disregards under the Work Incentive
Program (WIN)
Established in 1967,24 the Work Incentive Program (WIN) was
one of the federal government's early attempts at encouraging job
training and placement while improving the "financial incentive"
to leave welfare. 125 Instead of reducing benefits dollar for dollar as
income from earning grew, the amendments instituted "earnings
disregards" that allowed recipients to retain the first $30 of
monthly income and one-third of the rest before benefits would be
offset.'2 6 The objective was to encourage welfare mothers to work
their way off welfare. 27 Labor market participation, however, was
only slightly affected by WIN. 2 8 In fact, the earnings disregards
approach may have increased the welfare caseload because work
and welfare were no longer mutually exclusive. 2 9 As a result, the
earnings disregard provision failed to require recipients to leave
welfare altogether. 30 In fact, many women previously ineligible
for welfare because of their work earnings became eligible because
a portion of their salary was disregarded in calculating eligibility.
2. The OBRA Caps
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981131 (OBRA)
sought to reduce program costs and caseloads by replacing
AFDC's earnings disregard provisions with reductions in eligibility
for working recipients and decreases in benefits. OBRA called for
a benefit reduction rate on earnings for working recipients of 100%
after four months of employment and it placed a cap on AFDC
eligibility at 150% of each state's standard of need. 32 For welfare
recipients, OBRA eliminated all economic incentive to work and
imposed more stringent work requirements. Three years after the
OBRA caps were installed, work participation fell from approxi-
124. Work Incentive Program, supra note 26.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iv).
127. See generally Work Incentive Program, supra note 124.
128. The proportion of AFDC mothers who worked fluctuated between 15% and
16% from 1961 to 1973. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT, 17-18 (1976).
129. The AFDC caseload grew from approximately 5 million in 1967 (the year WIN
was enacted) to approximately 11 million in 1977. Congressional Research Service,
"Welfare Reform IP 98W," The Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 1994.
130. O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69, at 69-70.
131. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357
(1981).
132. Id.
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mately 16% to 5%.133 OBRA was able to reduce the caseload at
the national level and in various states effectively through reduced
eligibility; 34 however, there has been a constant caseload increase
from 1982 to the present. 135
Researchers point out that those women who lost eligibility en-
tirely on account of the OBRA cap rules had to work more; never-
theless, their total income did not increase significantly. 36
Additional hours worked at low-wage jobs barely replaced the lost
AFDC benefits. 37 This exemplifies the importance of addressing
the inadequacy of current wage levels. Those women who, despite
working additional hours, were unable to increase their earnings to
an amount adequate to attain self-sufficiency, may have had to re-
turn to the welfare rolls, thereby increasing recidivism. Considera-
ble evidence supports the dynamics of low-wage jobs and welfare
recidivism. 38 Women who take low-wage jobs with no benefits
and high turnover rates frequently find themselves with no alterna-
tive but' to reapply for welfare. 139
Thus, it appears that altering benefit levels, attaining benefit re-
duction rates to account for income from work, and modifying eli-
gibility rules have only a modest impact in increasing labor market
participation or substantially decreasing the AFDC caseload. 40
133. Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the US. Welfare System: A Review, 30 J.
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 1, 12, tbl. 4 (1992).
134. Janice Peskin et al., How The Economy Affects AFDC Caseloads (paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and
Management, Denver 1992) (on file with the author). According to the House Ways
and Means Committee, the national caseload appears to have decreased by approxi-
mately one-half million from 1981 (the year OBRA was enacted) to 1982.
135. Id.
136. See Robert Hutchens, The Effect of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981 on AFDC Recipients: A Review of Studies, in RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS
(Ronald G. Ehrenberg, ed. 1986).
137. Id.
138. LADONNA PAVETrI, : LEARNING FROM VOICES OF MOTHERS: SINGLE
MOTHERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN WELFARE AND WORK 8
(Manpower Demonstration Research Corp. Working Papers 1993).
139. Id. at 8-9.
140. Results from the Negative Income Tax Experiments which subjected large
numbers of experimental families to different program parameters with in more sig-
nificant ranges have shown more significant labor supply effects. See generally Gary
Burtless, The Work Response to a Guaranteed Income: A Survey of Experimental Evi-
dence, in LESSONS FROM THE INCOME MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENTS (Alicia H. Mun-
nell ed., 1987).
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B. Behavior-Based Strategies
Current welfare reform discussions link the growth in welfare
caseloads and long-term dependency to socially perverse behavior
allegedly underwritten by the welfare system. 41 Increasing pro-
portions of births out-of-wedlock are thought to represent socially
undesirable behavior with clear and significant links to extended
welfare receipt. 142 Income support for single parents is thought to
reduce the harsh consequences of out-of-wedlock births and, as a
result, many have argued, encourage it. Thus, many current state
welfare experiments reduce the benefits of subsequent
pregnancies to current welfare recipients by: (i) denying additional
benefits for the birth of another child; (ii) reducing the grant for
each additional child; or (iii) requiring pregnant teenagers to live at
home with their parents in order to qualify for benefits.143
The rationale for capping or reducing welfare benefits for subse-
quent births is that economic incentives are central to behavioral
change. Several recent efforts to reduce initial and subsequent
childbearing of teenagers, however, have had surprisingly discour-
aging results. 44 A range of well-designed programmatic efforts,
which provide a number of economic incentives and punishments,
social services, educational and employment-related interventions,
have yielded disappointing results in affecting teenage
pregnancies. 45 Because each of these programs uses some of the
mechanisms proposed in the ongoing welfare reform debate,'46
their evaluations provide important lessons.
Two of these programs, Project Redirection and New Chance,
are incentive-driven behavior models. These programs are
141. Personal Responsibility Act, § 100 (1995); Work Opportunity Act, § 101(a)(2)
(modyifying section 401).
142. See supra notes 84 to 91 and accompanying text.
143. Currently Georgia and New Jersey are examples of two states where recipients
will not have their benefits increased when they have additional children while on
welfare. See GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-115 (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 44:10-3.5. Welfare experiments in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Vermont, and Wisconsin all require pregnant teenagers to live at home (or in an ap-
proved setting) in order to receive benefits. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11254
(Deering 1991 & Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88a, § 54a (1995); MAss. GEN.
LAws. ANN. ch. 118, § 2 (West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-13-115 (1993); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 1103 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.19 (1995).
144. For a discussion of examples, see infra part III.B.1.
145. See Rebecca Maynard, The Effectiveness of Interventions Aimed at Reducing
the Incidence of Teenage Pregnancy and Mitigating the Consequences of Early
Childbearing (paper prepared for the 1994 Annual Research Meeting of the Associa-
tion for Policy Policy and Management) (on file with the author).
146. See generally Personal Responsibility Act; Work Opportunity Act.
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designed to reduce the number of teen mothers on the AFDC rolls
by rewarding certain behavior. TWo other programs, the Teenage
Parent Demonstration Program (TPDP) and Ohio's Learning,
Earning and Parenting Program (LEAP), are designed to discour-
age socially undesirable fertility behavior by punishing it.
1. The Incentive Approach
Project Redirection is a demonstration project for teen parents,
17 years of age or younger, that offers comprehensive services, in-
cluding: education, training, mentoring, job placement, child care,
family planning and parenting training services. The project oper-
ates in four different sites: Boston; New York City; Phoenix, and
Riverside, California. 147 The demonstration project carefully eval-
uated the impacts of experimental groups against a comparable
control group. The New Chance program was located in sixteen
sites.14 8 With 95% of its clients having dropped out of high
school,149 New Chance offered comprehensive services such as edu-
cation, training and social services to its teenage-parent clients.
Project Redirection and New Chance were similar in that they
both employed the same management approach. In both, program
participation was voluntary and the role of the case manager was
considered to be one of a "caring adult." Also, an incentive or
reward system was used by both programs to encourage client par-
ticipation and performance. 50
2. The Punitive Model
In contrast, TPDP and LEAP were both mandatory programs
that sanctioned or penalized teens who failed to participate by im-
posing monthly AFDC grant reductions.' 5 1 Recipients who failed
to fulfill LEAP's school attendance requirements in any given
month, had $62 deducted from their monthly welfare payment;152
147. O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69, at 45.
148. OFFICE OF CHIEF ECONOMIST, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WHAT'S WORKING
(AND WHAT'S NOT): A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF




151. O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69, at 47.
152. Id. at 50.
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those participants who fulfilled LEAP's attendance requirements
each month had their grants increased by $62.153
TPDP lasted from late 1987 to mid-1991. 54 It had pilots in Cam-
den and Newark, New Jersey and Chicago, Illinois.'55 Its goal was
to build self-sufficiency through the provision of services, such as
workshops in child support, family planning, health and nutrition,
life skills, family management, employment preparation, education
preparation, and HIV and drug abuse prevention. 56 TPDP also
provided case management and support services (i.e., child care
and transportation assistance) to participating mothers. 57
LEAP, like TPDP and the incentive-based programs, also fo-
cused on increasing and maintaining the school enrollment and at-
tendance of single teenage mothers. 5 8 Unlike the other programs,
however, it only offered minimal case management services.
159
3. Comparison of Approaches
The limited employability or skill level of AFDC recipients justi-
fies the development of education and human capital enhancement
initiatives. Employment characteristics of mothers in AFDC re-
mains an important issue when considering new routes to decreas-
ing the growing welfare caseload. 160 Data from the Armed Forces
Qualifying Test confirm a dismal level of skills, even for those with
higher levels of formal education. 6'
Programs such as TPDP and Project Redirection focus primarily
on improving the educational level of recipients. TPDP requires
participants to enroll in school or job training, or else to find a job.
Project Redirection offers support and mentoring services. Educa-
tion, health and welfare services are also integrated in these pro-
153. Id. Therefore, a client who failed to meet the program requirements would
only receive a $212 grant for that month, whereas a client who satisfactorily fulfilled
the requirements would receive a $336 grant.
154. Id. at 47.
155. Id.
156. See O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69, at 47-48.
157. Id. at 48.
158. Id. at 49.
159. Id. at 49-50.
160. Currently, 4.9% of those on AFDC have below a ninth grade level of educa-
tion, 18.8% have some high school experience, 22.4% are high school graduates, 6.8%
have attended some college and 0.5% are college graduates. GREEN BOOK, supra
note 18, at 401.
161. O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69, at 26 (1994). Using data from NLSY wo-
men have shown that those who started out as unwed mothers and had an average
welfare stay of 72 months since their first birth had an average AFQT score only in
the 18th percentile, with 40% below the 10th percentile. Id. at 27.
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grams. Three factors are important for assessing the success of
these programs: (i) educational attainment; (ii) employment rates;
and (iii) welfare participation rates.
In TPDP, punitive AFDC grant reductions were assessed against
any eligible recipient who did not participate in the program.162 As
a result; it had over a 95% participation rate, and 79% ofits par-
ticipants were either in school, job training, or employmed two
years after entering the program.163 Nevertheless, 85% of the par-
ticipants' incomes continued to remain below the-poverty line.' 64
Project Redirection differed from TPDP in that it was a volun-
tary program. No punitive measures were assessed against those
who elected not to participate. The educational outcomes in this
program were disappointing. Project Redirection participants
were found to be no different from those in a control group not
taking part in the program. Moreover, welfare participation
among Project Redirection participants initially remained higher
than among a control group. At the two-year follow-up, 68% of
the control group received welfare as opposed to 75% of Project
Redirection participants. 65 The percentage then decreased signifi-
cantly at the five-year follow-up audit for both groups-59% for
controls as opposed to 49% for program participants. 66
These outcomes offer two important lessons about human capital
focused models. First, programs such as TPDP, that successfully
improve the education level of their participants, may not be able
to help them escape poverty. Second, mandatory education pro-
grams, such as TPDP have better overall participation than volun-
tary programs such as Project Redirection.
One explanation for why voluntary programs are not as effective
in maintaining client participation as mandatory programs is that
few recipients prefer to participate in a basic education program
that is provided in a traditional school setting. An analysis of a
seven-site national evaluation of JOBS indicates that the JOBS ac-
tivity that recipients prefer to engage in involves direct job place-
ment or training: 49-68% prefer to "go to school to learn a job
skill"; 25% prefer to "go to a program to get help looking for a
162. WHAT'S WORKING, supra note 148, at 22-23.
163. Id. at 22.
164. Id. at 23.
165. O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69, at 46.
166. 1d
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job";167 and only 5-11% want to "go to school to study basic read-
ing and math."'168
Although all four of these programs allocated a considerable
amount of their resources to fertility-behavior control (family plan-
ning and counselling were two types of interventions often em-
ployed), the incidence of repeat pregnancy remained high in all of
them-regardless of whether or not the program took an incentive
or a punitive approach.169 The pregnancy rates actually increased
among participants in the New Chance program by 8%. 7° The
abortion rates also increased in the New Chance sites.171 Surpris-
ingly, in Project Redirection and TPDP sites, the abortion rate de-
creased and the live birth rate increased. 172 These results are
discouraging and confounding; they demonstrate the comple na-
ture of childbearing decisions, which apparently are relatively in-
sensitive to economic incentives.
Only a small health-focused intervention program called the
Teenage Parent Health Care Program, which sought to improve
the health-care and parenting skills of new mothers, had any signif-
icant impact on the fertility behavior of teenage mothers. Social
workers in this program provided intensive case-management to
mothers under age seventeen for up to eighteen months after their
delivery.173 This program was able to decrease the teenage repeat
pregnancy rate of their participants by 57%.174
Though considerable political rewards come from proposing in-
centives or punitive strategies to change socially destructive fertil-
ity behavior among adolescents, neither approach seems to have
much effect. Large scale, carefully designed and evaluated pro-
gram models of both types demonstrate that teenage childbearing
167. In the Atlanta site, this percentage was 42%.
168. Gayle Hamilton & Thomas Brock, The Employment Potential Of Welfare Re-
cipients 12 (paper presented at the Annual Research Conference of the Association
for Public Policy and Management 1994) (on file with the author). The authors of this
paper adapted it from GARY HAMILTON & THOMAS BROCK, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE JOBS EVALUATION: EARLY LESSONS FROM SEVEN
SITES (1994). Because these are the very individuals for whom traditional education
systems have failed, it is not surprising that they prefer alternative models to improve
their employability; thus, they may gain more benefits from them.
169. A. O'Sullivan & Barbara Jacobsen, A Randomized Trial of a Health Care Pro-






174. O'Sullivan & Jacobsen, supra note 169.
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is a more difficult problem than many have thought. Early
childbearing and childbearing out-of-wedlock are a growing phe-
nomenon in society as a whole.175 Incentive models are ineffective;
punitive models are both ineffective and potentially destructive be-
cause of their adverse effect on the economic well-being of infants
and mothers. Research suggests that threats of economic depriva-
tion serve no socially useful purpose. Though there is a significant
reason to focus public policy on reducing teenage childbearing and
childbearing out-of-wedlock, it is likely that the current crop of
welfare reform proposals will have no discernible impact on this
behavior. Further, it seems that already disadvantaged teens and
their children will be further impoverished under these proposals,
which, in effect, are punitive.
IV. The Welfare-to-Work Strategy
The bipartisan support for the Family Support Act 176 came in
part from the consensus that (i) work should be preferred to wel-
fare and that (ii) recipients should be expected to make efforts to
improve their employability and to find work in exchange for in-
come support. 7 7 The FSA requires state programs to offer a range
of services in return for federal matching grants.178 Notably, FSA
legislation drew heavily on research demonstrating that these kinds
of services could improve the employment prospects of recipients,
if only modestly, at prevailing levels of investment.'7 9
Considerable research on state work-welfare programs under the
Omnibus Budget Rehabilitation Act 180 suggests that increased em-
ployment among recipients could be achieved with modest invest-
ments in education and employment and training activities-
including job search skills.' 81 Nevertheless, during the implemen-
tation of OBRA, increased incomes came most often through in-
creased hours at work rather than through increased wages in post-
175. NATIONAL CENTER OF HEALTH STATISTICS, 42 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS
REPORT, tbl. 4 at 20 (Supp. 3 1993); NATIONAL CENTER OF HEALTH STATISTICS, AD-
VANCED REPORT OF FINAL NATALITY STATISTICS (1991).
176. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
177. See generally Family Support Act.
178. Id.
179. Baum, supra note 54, at 607-609.
180. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
181. See generally CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY RESEARCHER, supra note 37.
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program employment. 182 These research findings were significant
because the emphasis was on low cost interventions. 183
Evaluations of these programs found that employment and job
training programs were cost beneficial to the states. 1' Post-pro-
gram recipients were better off and received less welfare. They
continued, however, to earn low wages.' 8 5 Thus, program out-
comes were positive and cost beneficial but provided little opti-
mism that modest levels of investment would dramatically reduce
the overall caseload. The FSA, under its JOBS program, built on
these findings and increased both mandates and incentives (in the
form of increased federal matching rates) to encourage state in-
vestments in job training, particularly for high-risk recipients. 186
Continuing research using sophisticated experimental design,
monitors the success of state job training programs, particularly
those on which the JOBS program was based. Unfortunately, be-
cause the recession in the early 1990s coincided with the implemen-
tation of JOBS, many states are behind in their performance
goals.' 87 As a result, a review of the most intensively researched
state programs may provide an exaggeration of what will likely be
the experience under JOBS in other states. Nevertheless, the re-
view identifies key findings and implications for emerging welfare
reform efforts.
'A. State Welfare to Work Initiatives
Three heavily researched state programs include The Saturation
Work Initiative Model of San Diego (SWIM), 8 8 California's
Greater Avenues for Independence Program (GAIN) 8 9 and Flor-
ida's Project Independence (PI).' 90 Each of these programs re-
quires mandatory participation and imposes sanctions or reduces
182. Id. Often, however, increased hours at work were necessary merely to offset
lost benefits. See supra part III.A.
183. Costs per participant ranged from $102-$953. See generally Sanger, supra note
38; Lurie & Sanger, supra note 48. See also U.S. GENERAL AccoUrrING OFFICE,
WORK AND WELFARE: CURRENT AFDC WORK PROGRAMS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
FEDERAL POLICY (1987) [hereinafter "GAO REPORT-AFDC WORK PROGRAMS"].
184. See GAO REPORT-AFDC WORK PROGRAMS, supra note 183.
185. Id.
186. Id. The JOBS program emphasized more education and training and insured
that support services like Medicaid, child care and transportation would be funded
and continued for one year after employment. Id.
187. Id.
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the monthly AFDC benefits of eligible recipients who do not par-
ticipate. In addition, each program has a basic education, training
and job search component.
Impact evaluations by the Manpower Demonstration Research
Corporation (MDRC) found that GAIN and SWIM participants
enjoyed modest increases in their annual earnings which, in turn,
increased welfare savings. 191 Average earnings increases ranged
from approximately $300 to $700 per year for all eligible program
participants. 92 These increases can, however, be largely attributed
to increases in the amount of time the participants worked during
the year as opposed to increases in their wage rates. 93 This ex-
plains why these programs had little effect on the long-term earn-
ings ability of participants. Research shows that the modest
earnings gains seen in the short-run fade out in about five years. 94
A second finding of MDRC's evaluations was that both SWIM and
GAIN were able to'reduce welfare participation modestly. It ap-
pears, however, that the positive overall affects of the program,
namely the reduction in AFDC participation, decreases over
time.' 95
B. General Conclusions From Welfare-to-Work Research
An important finding from evaluations of the welfare-to-work
(or employment and job training) programs is that they have little
effect on poverty levels. Research by the U.S. Department of La-
bor found that three years after entry into GAIN, 80% of the pro-
gram participants had annual incomes below the poverty line.' 96
This emphasizes the need for policy-makers to consider wage or
191. D. FRIEDLANDER ET AL., MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP.,
GAIN: Two YEAR IMPACTS IN SIx CouNTRIES (1993); D. FRIEDLANDER & GAYLE
HAMILTON, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., THE SATURATION
WORK INITIATIVE MODEL (SWIM) IN SAN DIEGO (1993)..
192. See FRIEDLANDER & HAMILTON, supra note 191, at 30-54.
193. Id at 41 ("[T]he earnings levels of jobs did not shift up or down as a result of
SWIM!,).
194. Id. at 32-33.
195. Id. In the two to five year quarter follow-up period of the SWIM program, the
amount of non-SWIM families that participated in AFDC during this period exper-
ienced a 4.6 percentage point increase. Id., tbl. 6.1 at 70-72. By the time data was
collected for the 18 - 21 quarter follow-up period, however, this percentage point
spread decreased to a 2 percentage point difference between the families participating
in SWIM and those who did not. Id., tbls. 6.3 & 6.4 at 77-82.
196. Their evaluation's one-year impact findings are similarto the findings from
GAIN and SWIM-AFDC participation decreased in the short-run, but these de-
creases eroded over time. Also, the program had very little effect on the long-term
earnings of its participants. See FRIEDLANDER ET AL. supra note 191.
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earning levels when attempting to develop a program that makes
AFDC recipients self-sufficient.
V. Lessons from Qualitative Research: Opinions and Attitudes
of Welfare Recipients Themselves
Empirical investigations of the impacts of various interventions
are critical to evaluating the consequences of the emerging federal
welfare reform proposals.197 Qualitative research that has sought
to reveal the attitudes and experiences of, welfare recipients pro-
vides enhanced understanding of the behavior of welfare
recipients. 198
Quantitative research on the impact of programs to reduce de-
pendence and increase labor market activity is generally designed
to test the hypotheses generated by economic theories. Most of
the current welfare reform proposals seek to alter welfare in order
to make the economic consequences associated with "socially un-
desirable" behavior more severe.1 99 Considerable evidence dem-
onstrates that welfare mothers-like most individuals in society-
are economically rational. Results from research intended to elicit
explanations of their behavior and their views of work and welfare,
however, provide a more complex picture of the motivations be-
hind their decision-making. Therefore, the findings of three recent
researches, eliciting the attitudes and opinions of welfare recipi-
ents, provide a particularly good opportunity to understand their
behavior. The research also provides insights that help us antici-
pate the likely responses of recipients to the sorts of programs that
are now being debated.2 ° °
A. The Views of JOBS Participants
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the
U.S. Department of Education contracted for a seven site evalua-
tion of the JOBS program.20 ' One portion of the evaluation re-
ports on the attitudes, opinions and characteristics of recipients
197. See generally Personal Responsibility Act; Work Opportunity Act.
198. Nevertheless, additional attention should be paid to this research.
199. See generally Personal Responsibility Act; Work Opportunity Act.
200. See generally Hamilton & Brock, supra note 168; PAVETTI, supra note 138;
KATHRYN EDIN, CENTER FOR URBAN AND POLICY RESEARCH AND THE DEPART-
MENT OF SOCIOLOGY, RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY, THE
MYTHS OF DEPENDENCE AND SELF SUFFICIENCY: WOMEN, WELFARE AND Low
WAGE WORK (1994) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
201. Hamilton & Brock, supra note 168, at 1.
1996] REDEFINING THE WELFARE REFORM DEBATE 305
mandated to participate in the program.2 °2 The JOBS participants
disclosed the barriers to their participation in education and em-
ployment and training programs. They revealed a significant con-
cern about the availability of childcare and transportation costs. 20 3
Further, many indicated that they had serious family problems or
that they feared leaving their children to participate in JOBS activ-
ites.2° In addition, consistent with LaDonna Pavetti's research,20 5
between 14% and 23% of respondents said they already had too
much to do during the day to participate in JOBS activities.0 6
When asked about their preferred JOBS activities, respondents
in four sites overwhelmingly chose training for a job skill.20 7 Next
in preference was job search assistance. 08 Few chose basic educa-
tion-most likely because they had limited previous success in the
formal education system. Many JOBS participants identified work
impediments in the program and expressed concern about child-
care and health protection. Nevertheless, an overwhelming 87% in
all sites thought the expectation of work was fair.20 9 They gener-
ally had realistic wage expectations of about $7.00 to $7.66 an hour,
with medical benefits.210 Most, however, had serious concerns
about taking jobs without health benefits.211 Finally, most JOBS
participants reported a lack of control in some areas of their
lives,212 suggesting that in addition to training, support services,
such as counseling, are surely needed. These attitudes and opin-
ions of JOBS program participants provide unique insights, distinct
202. Id. Enrollees in JOBS in these seven sites differed dramatically in their charac-
teristics and "job readiness" as measured by work experience, education and skill
level as reflected in their reading and math. They also varied in their needs for child
care. One third of the JOBS enrollees studied have reading or math test scores that
make it difficult for them to obtain or keep jobs other than those at the most menial
level. Id. at 2. In Portland the Oregon BASIS reading and math tests found that 32%
had score at levels in math so low that they would be unable to calculate gas mileage,
reconcile a bank statement and 3% could not write a letter or service order. Id. at 9.
203. Twenty-seven percent of the sample in each site indicated that either they or a
family member had a health or emotional problem that prevented them from partici-
pating in JOBS activities. Hamilton & Brock, supra note 168, at tbl. 3.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 12.
207. Between forty nine and sixty eight perecent of the respondants chose training.
Hamilton and Brock, supra note 168, at tbl. 3.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 13.
211. If they did so, their wages in three sites increased by about $2.50 an hour.
Hamilton and Brock, supra note 168, at 14.
212. Id. at 15.
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from much of the empirical research reviewed above, about the
affects of different welfare programs on it recipients. 213
B. Intensive Interviews with Recipients in Boston and a
Midwestern City
In a similar vein, LaDonna Pavetti conducted intensive inter-
views with single mothers on welfare in the Boston area. 14 At the
time of the interviews a progressive, well-funded, welfare-to-work
program existed.21 5 The program provided an extensive array of
employment and training opportunities for welfare clients.216 Re-
cipients' views on leaving welfare for work, wage expectations, job
preparation strategies and perceived barriers were consistent with
the JOBS enrollees. 217 The women Pavetti interviewed did not ex-
pect to be better off when they left welfare for work, and viewed
the benefits of working primarily in non-economic terms.218 The
interviews provide significant insight into the dilemmas women
face in their dual role as workers and mothers. Work-welfare rela-
tionships emerge as a continuum because women on welfare, in
general, had work experience before their initial application for
welfare. Many had left welfare for work and then returned; some
returned after having been off welfare for substantial periods of
time and others for only short periods.219
The movement between work and welfare is fluid.22° The wo-
men Pavetti interviewed described their experiences not as a series
of failures, but as lessons that prepared them to reevaluate their
choices and helped them to develop plans for reentering the labor
force at a later time.22' Many learned that their skill levels were
too low to justify the costs of working.222 When they reentered
welfare they often enrolled in training and education programs to
increase their skill levels.223
213. First, most want to work and obtain the necessary job training. Their skill
levels are quite variable. A significant minority, though, have skills that make work at
a reasonable wage level unlikely without significant education or training.
214. PAVETI, supra note 138, at 1.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2.
217. See supra part V.A. for more information on the views of JOBS enrollees.
218. See PAVETri, supra note 138, at 6.
219. Id. at 22.
220. Many women in the sample worked part-time while on welfare. Id. at 10.
221. Id. at 22.
222. Id. at 10.
223. See PAVETTI, supra note 138, at 10.
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Most striking from these interviews, is the significant impact that
the well-being of the children had on mothers' decisions to enter
and leave welfare. Health care was a primary concern and, like the
JOBS enrollees, entered significantly into decisions about work.224
Mothers reported that they were simply unwilling to take a job
without having health coverage.225 Their estimates of how much
they would need to be paid in order to be better off working va-
fled. Most estimated wage rates were around $8 or $9 an hour.226
But many found childcare-its cost, availability and quality-a
major barrier to employment. 227 Most were aware of the instability
of their situations, having experienced previous failure in their at-
tempts to leave welfare. Most failed on account of child care ar-
rangements, financial need or jobs that simply did not work out.228
For those in part-time jobs or low-wage jobs, public assistance,
such as food stamps and housing subsidies, provided crucial finan-
cial support. Other women viewed these benefits more as a safety
net that allows them some security if they take a risk such as leav-
ing welfare for work. In short, the women in this study viewed
welfare as a safety net rather than as a way of life.
The concept of welfare as a safety net rather than a way of life
often is not Clearly revealed to researchers who use data from the
Current Population Survey or even the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youth. 2 9 Women on welfare seldom report the extent of
their actual work. Though many women appear to be cyclers be-
tween work and welfare, 230 a good many more are working "off the
books" because they can live neither on the wages generated by
low-wage employment nor on the average level of benefits they
receive. 231 An extraordinarily enlightening and unique study of
welfare mothers in a Midwestern city in an average, benefit-level
state was privy to confidential revelations about actual, rather than
224. Id. at 9.
225. Id.
226. Those working had jobs paying between $8-$10 an hour. Id. at 8.
227. Like the JOBS enrollees, many had health problems that prevented them from
working.
228. PAVETI, supra note 138, at 9.
229. O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 69, at 15-16.
230. DAVID ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY
(1988).
231. See generally KATHRYN EDIN, CENTER FOR URBAN AND POLICY RESEARCH
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW
JERSEY, THE MYTHS OF DEPENDENCE AND SELF SUFFICIENCY: WOMEN, WELFARE
AND Low WAGE WORK (1994) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
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reported, income packaging by welfare mothers.232 This study
draws a picture of mothers forced to develop income packages
through both legal and illegal work and other unreported income
sources, such as some support from family members or gifts from
boyfriends.233 Edin reports that a significant misunderstanding
persists in large part because most "theorizing about low wage
work, welfare, and poverty among single parent families has been
done without any reference to how much money it actually takes to
support a family. ' 234 Thus, she found that by necessity everyone in
her sample had supplemental work income.235
Welfare reform experiments and proposals at both the state and
federal levels are based on assumptions about the beliefs and ambi-
tions of welfare mothers that appear to be at odds with what the
research from these and other careful and intimate portraits pro-
vide. Research shows a caseload whose employability varies. It
also shows that recipients want to work and feel it is a reasonable
expectation that they should work. Nevertheless, employment that
provides a survival level income is not likely for the bulk of the
caseload. The limitations of the low-wage labor market, including
low annual incomes, the absence of benefits-particularly health
benefits-and the absence of security are critical obstacles to "in-
dependence." The failure to address these realities is the fatal flaw
of the current approaches to welfare reform.
VI. Recent Welfare Initiatives
A. State Welfare Experiments
Over the last two years, the Federal government has granted
waivers that allow individual states to exercise wide flexibility in
the design of their individual welfare programs. This flexibility
arose in anticipation of federal welfare reform efforts promised at
the start of the Clinton Administration.236 In fact, many of the
more popular program features included in recent federal welfare
232. Id.
233. Id. at 11.
234. Id at 1. As additional support, Edin discusses Gallup poll results which con-
sistently show that respondent beliefs about how much income a family of four needs
to survive was at 140-160% of the poverty line. This finding is also supported by
independent research estimating the lowest realistic costs for basic necessities at
155% of the poverty line or $20,660 in 1991. See John E. Schwartz & Thomas J.
Volgy, The American Prospect, Spring 1992, at 67-93.
235. See generally EDIN, supra note 231.
236. See generally Michael Kranish, Clinton Unveils Welfare Reform Proposal, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 1994, at 3.
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reform proposals are already being implemented at the state
level.z37
Table 1 at the end of this Article summarizes the key compo-
nents of several state experimental programs in 1995. In general,
the present round of state welfare reform experiments reflects five
main elements.238 The first element, which also characterizes cur-
rent federal proposals, is a time-limit on the consecutive months or
years for which a client is eligible for benefits. 39 Some states have
a total limit over a lifetime;240 others provide for a time limit on
any given spell, and require a waiting period before reapplication
can be made. 41 The second, and most popular, feature of experi-
mental state programs is a work requirement, whereby recipients
must work off their grants in community service activities if they do
not find private employment for a specified number of hours a
week.242 A third feature is the imposition of a "cap" on total fam
ily benefits, which would exclude the provision of additional bene-
fits (and indeed, in some cases impose a financial penalty) for any
subsequent births a woman might have while on welfare. 43
Fourth, some have conditioned eligibility upon an unmarried teen-
age mother living at home with a parent(s).244 Finally, some states
require that eligibility for benefits for pregnant teenagers or teen-
agers with young children is conditioned on school attendance and/
or graduation.245 Most recent state AFDC waiver applications ap-
ply under one or a combination of these elements.z46
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Virginia, and Wisconsin, states which
impose the most rigorous demands on recipients, are the only
states, thus far, initiating a welfare experiment that combines a
time-limit, a work requirement, and a family cap component. 47
237. For a listing of 31 states which designed programs pursuant to a federal waiver,
see infra tbl. 1.
238. Id. (summarizing use by 31 states of various welfare experiments - time lim-









247. See infra tbl. 1. On February 9, 1995, the Massachusetts legislature passed a
bill that requires "able-bodied" recipients with school-age children to work after their
having received benefits for sixty days. Able-bodied is defined as anyone other than a
person who is: a teenage parent attending high school, an expectant mother in the
third trimester of pregnancy, a woman who just gave birth, a disabled person, or a
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For example, the Massachusetts system no longer increases bene-
fits of recipients who have more children while on welfare, and it
discontinues a recipient's -benefits altogether after two years. 48
Under Massachusetts law, teenage mothers are required to live at
home or in an appropriate setting, and to finish high school in or-
der to be eligible for benefits.2 49 Moreover, the state's Department
of Welfare has been renamed the "Department of Transitional
Assistance. "25 o
These features are similar to the proposal of Governor Pataki of
New York, whose recent 1995-96 Executive Budget proposal called
for dramatic changes in the state's welfare programs.25' In addition
to a workfare component and learn-fare component, New York
State plans to require teenage mothers to live at home with their
parents as a condition of eligibility.252 New York proposes to in-
crease the earned income disregard (the amount a working recipi-
ent can retain before benefits are reduced), and instead, to reduce
maximum welfare payments.253
All state initiatives are directed toward increasing the restric-
tions on eligibility.254 Though there are some states, like New
York, that have sought to alter benefits formulae-especially in-
come disregards for working recipients-most "reforms" are be-
havior-based strategies designed to punish socially undesirable
behavior. It is particularly striking that none of the additional state
initiatives include significant new allocations for employment and
training. In most state programs, investments in client services are
not central to the initiatives.
B. Initiatives on the National Level
State level welfare experimentation informs the federal welfare
reform arena. Though the past year has produced a' spate of wel-
fare reform proposals including President Clinton's Work and Re-
sponsibility Act (WRA),255 the features many political observers
person caring for a disabled family member. State Seeks Welfare Waiver, MASS. LAW.
WKLY., Apr. 10, 1995, at 31.
248. See infra tbl. 1.
249. Id
250. Michael Cooper, Massachusetts Governor Signs Bill Overhauling Welfare, N.Y.,
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1995, at A7.




254. See infra tbl. 1.
255. H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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feel will most likely be included in any final legislation are those
contained in the Republican proposal, the Personal Responsibility
Act of 1995 (PRA),256 a version of which was recently passed by
Congress and vetoed by President Clinton.z5 7 The key provisions
of the PRA that are relevant to AFDC would do the following: (i)
make lump sum "capped" payments to the states; (ii) prohibit the
use of federal tax dollars to pay cash welfare to teen mothers with
out-of-wedlock children, to pay the "child portion" of the grant for
any child whose paternity has not been established, to increase
payments for families that have more children while on welfare,
and to offer benefits to any recipient for more than five years over
a lifetime; (iii) merge federal food-assistance programs and subject
a number of other major programs for low-income families to a
spending cut; (iv) make non-citizens (legal and illegal immigrants)
ineligible for most welfare programs; and (v) impose work require-
ments on all recipients. 25 8
The implications of this bill and other similar proposals are clear:
AFDC would no longer be an entitlement and states would have
considerable discretion in program design. Based on the current
state policy directions under federal waivers, states will be unlikely
to invest further on improving the pay off from work or to augment
the employment prospects of recipients through employment and
training programs.
In June 1994, President Clinton introduced his administration's
long awaited welfare reform proposal "to end welfare as we know
it."'259 Unlike the Republican plan, his bill would retain the eligibil-
ity component of the current system that treats welfare as an enti-
tlement.26 ° Unmarried teenage mothers and legal aliens would
have remained eligible for benefits.26' States would, however, be
allowed to refuse payment increases to families who have addi-
tional children while on welfare.262 The Clinton plan also requires
256. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1 Sess. (1995).
257. See Robert Pear, Battle Over the Budget. The Legislation; Clinton Vetoes
G.O.P. Plan to Change Welfare System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at B7.
258. The bill proposes dramatic changes in other programs as well including: all
food assistance programs, the Supplemental Security Income program and the Child
Support Assistance program. Aggregate spending would be capped for SS, AFDC
and others. See DAN BLOOM ET. AL., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT: AN ANALYSIS (1995).
259. Elizabeth Shogren, Clinton Unveils Welfare Reform Legislation, L.A. TIMES,
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American citizens to take greater responsibility of the immigrants
263they sponsor. The bill provided recipients with up to two years
of training and education and guarantees them publicly financedjobs if they are unable to secure jobs in the private market.".
VII. Anticipating Impacts of Reform
The American welfare system and continual efforts to reform it
have faltered largely on account of a conflict between the compet-
ing goals of decreasing poverty and reducing costs and caseloads.
If welfare benefits are reduced and eligibility is constricted, costs
and caseloads will obviously be reduced. There is, however, little
evidence that poverty and insecurity will be reduced without signif-
icantly altering the employment prospects and wage levels avail-
able to welfare recipients. Research evidence on the impact of
various welfare programs indicates that current proposals provide
very little expectation that employment prospects will improve. In
addition, it is unreasonable to expect that women who are now on
welfare will be able to generate an income that will sustain them,
given the character of the low-wage labor market and the opportu-
nities for skills training and education.
At the moment it is unclear what the precise nature of the ulti-
mate reform of the welfare system will be; however, the thrust of
the changes seems certain. The State's commitment to ensuring
the economic well-being of families and children is eroding. The
most potentially serious consequence of this erosion of State re-
sponsibility is the removal of the entitlement status of AFDC. The
entitlement status of the food stamp program faces a similar threat
and the important counter-cyclical role of welfare will be certainly
compromised. Individual states may be forced to deny otherwise
eligible recipients benefits at the first sign of recession. Alterna-
tively, states would bear any additional economic burden of pro-
tecting these families beyond the federal block grant amounts.
Ironically, states have already shown themselves to be less ag-
gressive partners in insuring services and support to low-income
families in the JOBS program than federal policymakers had antic-
ipated. Fiscal pressures at the state level significantly impacts the
generosity of local income-support programs. In an environment
with a withdrawal of federal funding for entitlements and prevail-
ing fiscal constraints at the state and local level, even a moderate
263. Id.
264. Shogren, supra note 259.
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recession could have a devastating effect on poverty among women
and children.
Time limits are another element of both state experiments and
federal proposals. Time limits can be of two types: (i) a maximum
number of months or years between spells; or (ii) a total time inclu-
sive of all spells. As discussed above, research bears significantly
on assessing the potential impacts of these proposals. First, women
want to work and believe it is fair to require them to do so. At
current levels of investment, state education, employment and
training, and job placement programs under JOBS have been mod-
estly successful in improving the employment and income of wel-
fare mothers. Nevertheless, most of the success has come from
increased hours of work rather than increased wages. Because
many welfare recipients have very significant skill deficits, overall
levels of poverty, welfare receipt, and unemployment remain high
even after introduction of employment and training programs. Ef-
forts to alter wage rates and employment prospects significantly
will require longer term and more expensive interventions than are
currently being offered by state JOBS programs. To leave welfare
for full-time employment, women will need childcare and health
coverage. Time limited proposals will force women to work with-
out those basic protections.265
Low-wage work lacks such protections as healthcare and bene-
fits; it also lacks security. Jobs are frequently turned over and are
sensitive to economic downturns. Most welfare recipients work or
have worked. Cycling between work and welfare is often a reflec-
tion of the instability of the low-wage labor market and the inade-
quacy of the wages that recipients often package with additional
income support. Under time limits, women who lose their jobs will
have no safety net if they have already "used up" their welfare
time. They may find themselves with little source of support if
food stamps, too, are threatened. This is especially troubling to
those with inadequate work history to qualify them for unemploy-
ment insurance.
Some kind of family "cap" also appears likely. Families who
have an additional child while on welfare will be denied additional.
support for that child or more punitively, will have their benefits
reduced. Significant research has demonstrated the relative insen-
sitivity of fertility behavior to economic incentives or punishments.
265. Current proposals seek to reduce even further the economic rewards from
work by reducing significantly the value of income supplementation under the earned
income tax credit.
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The research indicates that fertility behavior is complicated. Few
interventions have demonstrated much success in altering repro-
ductive behavior. Imposition of income penalties will make chil-
dren worse off with little realistic expectation that the behavior of
their parent(s) will be altered. The congressional bill to deny bene-
fits entirely to teen mothers who have their children out-of-wed-
lock would have a devastating impact on their well-being without
any evidence of positive behavioral impact.
Finally, it seems clear that workfare will be central to all state
programs regardless of the fate of AFDC and food stamps as an
entitlement. Workfare has few significant positive effects on the
future employment of participants, but is unlikely to create signifi-
cant hardships. Most states find workfare more expensive and dif-
ficult to manage than they initially anticipate because the
imposition of sanctions is central to insuring compliance. As a ve-
hicle to show some short-term caseload savings and thus address
current public concerns regarding welfare reform, workfare has
been used successfully. Nevertheless, as a means of providing
work experience and job training to those who cannot find private
sector employment, its impacts have been modest. To improve em-
ployability, workfare requires a high degree of investment in man-
agement and oversight of placements on sight to provide a
meaningful experience for participants.266 Workfare is unlikely to
give recipients the skills they need to obtain private employment.
Conclusion
Meaningful efforts to move welfare clients to work without im-
poverishing them will require significant and, perhaps, costly in-
vestments in training, childcare, health coverage and income and
wage supplementation (such as an expansion of the earned income
tax credit). None of the current proposals are designed to invest
significant new resources in these efforts. Realistic assessment of
the current debate reveals how little it is informed by the body of
literature regarding the determinants of work and welfare, and
how much it is a reflection of a purely political and philosophical
clash between competing values that have always characterized the
tensions in American social policy. The outcomes of these political
decisions will be devastating if real opportunities for poor women
to support their families decently through the regular labor market
are absent. These policies will exacerbate growing patterns of in-
266. See generally Lurie & Sanger, supra note 48.
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come inequality and threats to social cohesion. A review of the
significant dissension between what is proposed and what the re-
search suggests will be needed to reduce poverty and welfare
dependence.
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Table 1: State Welfare Experiments in 1995
REQUIRE
TIME WORK FAMILY CHILD LIVE LEARN












MARYLAND * * *









OKLAHOMA * * *
SOUTH DAKOTA * *
VERMONT * * *
VIRGINIA * * * *
WASHINGTON *
WEST VIRGINIA *
WISCONSIN * * *
WYOMING * *
Source: Dep't of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Planning & Evaluation, Office of Human Services Policy, December 11, 1995.
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